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Yaw's avatar

Great read, I agree WNF has fundamental flaws on not weighing human capital enough, and I hope that one day Acemoglu comes around and weighs markets more importantly than he currently does. Although I don't find that likely.

Another thing that should make him reconsider his thesis is basically the cases of China vs India and Vietnam vs Philippines..

China and Vietnam are both one party autocracies countries that reformed to become more market oriented in the 1980s (Gaige Kanfang under Deng Xiaopeng in China and Doi Moi under Nguyễn Văn Linh in Vietnam). In the late 1980s, India was still richer per capita than China but by the 1990s, China blew past india.

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2002&locations=CN-IN&start=1962

I remember Acemoglu said in his book something along the lines of "while autocracies can be fast growing for some time, they cant sustain it. Look at the Soviets, they grew fast after WWII but stagnate by the Brezhnev era and was only hanging on by oil exports after the 1973 crisis and the 1979 iranian oil production drop post Iranian revolution. But by the 1980s when the oil glut happened the Soviet Union was fucked." But that argument is basically, "i know it seems that autocracies can grow fast, but give it time and i'll be vindicated". The issue is not only is that argument non-falsifiable, but even if you placebo test the "give it time, and you'll see that country stagnate" argument applies to democracies as well. Brazil and post apartheid South Africa were both fast growing in the early 2000s. But stagnated after 2014, because it turns out their growth was caused by commodity booms fueled by China but when China's import demand slowed down 2014-2015, so did these economies, and stagnated since over the last 10 years.

Vietnam vs. Philippines is probably another great counter. Philippines was quite literally the 4th richest asian country per capita post WWII losing only to Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. It was slightly richer than Malaysia, and much richer than Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia and more. It had the highest adult literacy in east asia and had constitutional government modelled after the U.S. Meanwhile Vietnam was basically in four consecutive wars with major powers since WWII (Japan during WWII, France during decolonization, then America, then a brief border war with China after Vietnam invaded Cambodia), was sanctioned hard by the US, and then after market reforms with Doi Moi we now see Vietnam becoming slightly richer than the Philippines.

I wrote more about that Vietnam vs. Philippines here if you are interested. But it seems clear that with time, Acemoglu will have to update his model about inclusive political institutions being a prereq for growth.

https://yawboadu.substack.com/p/the-2026-world-bank-scorecard-vietnam?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=garki

Miguel Madeira's avatar

"The issue is not only is that argument non-falsifiable"

I think they say that autocracies could grow faster, but by rapid accumulation of resources, not by innovation (and it is because this that their growth are not sustainable at the long term); that can be falsified - if some autocratic country have high growth rate not by high investment rate but by high growth of TFP (yes, the TFP growth is difficult to measure, but is possible to have a estimate, of the type "the growth of GP who are not the result of high investment or improvement in education is growth of TFP by definition")

barnabus's avatar

Soviet Union grew very little after WW2. Their growth spurt was 1920s, 1930s and WW2.

Yaw's avatar

Madison tables aren't perfect but its the best we got for Soviet gdp per capita estimates

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-maddison-project-database?tab=line&time=1946..1989&country=~OWID_USS

You can take the numbers and see the compound annual growth rates yourself.

From 1946 to 1956: Soviet Union gdp per capita grew 6.43% on average per year ($3049 to $5684).

From 1956 to 1966: USSR grew at 3.1%

From 1966 to 1976: USSR grew at 2.84%, at this point the Soviets arent ad growing as fast as the West, hence the stagnation era

From 1976 to 1986: USSR grew at 0.85%, grow was anemic then.

barnabus's avatar

Even 1946-1956 "growth" is nothing compared to Germany and Japan. But my feeling is that even that Soviet post-WW2 growth has been doctored.

Yaw's avatar

1. West Germany and Japan were quite literally the fastest growing in the advanced world so comparing to them is saying "it didnt beat the fastest post WWII boom countries! Soviet growth in the 1946-1956 era was still faster than France, Belgium Spain and Portugal. The Soviets had faster growth than UK & Netherlands for 30 years from 1946 to 1976, but had slower growth by 1976 to 1986.

2. The Madison tables DID NOT use soviet stats because they were doctored as you said. Madison had to estimate them. Madison used the CIA method by doing a bottom-up GNP calculation by looking at output (steel, electricity, grain yield), and then track tons of products. Then it did a factor cost adjustment (Soviet consumer goods had high turnover taxes but industrial goods were heavily subsidized), and then lastly it did comps to make sure its stats hit comparable countries. So in 1946, USSR was slightly richer than war-torn Japan and West Germany. In 1956, the Soviets were a tad richer than Franco Spain. By 1966, slightly poorer than Franco Spain. By 1976, slightly poorer than post revolution Portugal. By 1986, it was much poorer than Portugal.

Dave92f1's avatar

Singapore has regular and *mostly* fair elections. The PAP cares deeply about retaining the support of the electorate.

But aside from that, you're right here. Hong Kong had no elections at all. China doesn't have democracy worthy of the name. Yet capitalism reliably leads to widespread wealth.

Jonathan Carroll's avatar

Nice article and largely agree. Reminded of a post I saw a few months ago that asked what would've happened if the Industrial Revolution had been put up to a vote. Relatedly, to the extent that democracy has had a causal impact on growth, I'm more inclined to think the intermediate link is political stability rather than good policy.

Marian Kechlibar's avatar

I think that Acemoglu underestimates the cultural effects as well.

A current example: France and Switzerland are very old established democracies. Neighboring Germany had a significant totalitarian intermezzo in the 20th century, but ultimately all three are institutionally inclusive democracies.

And yet the Germans and the Swiss decided to keep their spending under some control, while the French systematically voted for an unsustainable welfare state that now threatens the entire Eurozone with a mother of all debt crises, and every time any French politician tries some lukewarm reforms, the people will set the streets alight to roll them back.

There is no space in Acemoglu's theories for situations where the nation as a whole acts as an extractive entity against itself and its own future.

Steve Sailer's avatar

Acemoglu's theory of "Inclusive Institutions" was popular because it explains away racial differences in national wealth:

Q. Why isn't Nigeria as New Zealand?

B. Well, it's obviously NOT because of what you are thinking, you horrible racist, you, it's because New Zealand has inclusive institutions!

Marian Kechlibar's avatar

I am not principially afraid of the idea that some places and ethnicities in the world are worse at governance than others, but it also does not explain things fully.

There is a wide variety of outcomes in Africa as well. Congo is hell on Earth, Nigeria is miserable. Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda seem to be on a positive trajectory. All those nations speak Niger–Congo languages predominantly, so I'd be surprised if their raw biology was that different from one another.

You can do the same mental experiment with Venezuela vs. Chile. It is almost forgotten that Venezuela once attracted a lot of European immigrants precisely because it was relatively wealthy and stable. Their grandkids now try to obtain Spanish and Italian passports by descent and come back.

barnabus's avatar

Rwanda is successful because of the Tutsis.

Marian Kechlibar's avatar

IDK if you know Steve Sailer, but he concentrates on racial differences a lot, and Tutsis are still black Africans.

barnabus's avatar

Yep, sure. However, Germany was the colonial power in Rwanda before WW1, and at that time, Germans were appreciative of the Tutsis' abilities compared to other Subsaharans.

Fullantho's avatar

Venezuela has diffrent demographics than Chile. More African and Canarian

Marian Kechlibar's avatar

Sure, but they were still a prosperous country for decades, enough to attract hundreds of thousands of Europeans to immigrate. I think it is quite safe to say that between the 1950s and the 1990s, Venezuelan governance got decidedly worse without any fresh influx of people from less developed nations; e.g. without a massive demographic change away from any measure of Western-ness that we usually use.

barnabus's avatar

Yep, but Venezuelans were particularly in line for the Dutch curse as a resource-rich country. And not being Dutch, they suffered several-fold more. Chile had/has no such money-minting resources.

Thorium1's avatar

There are two neighboring countries in the world, whose people share significant DNA and were governed by the same imperial power for more than a century. Hence initial and base conditions were quite similar.

In 1980, an average household in the autocratic country could purchase 31,000 kwh of electricity or 3200 litres of milk with their entire yearly income. Buying the cheapest new car on the market would cost 3.5 years of household income.

In 1980, in the democratic country, a year of household income could only purchase 25,000 kWh of electricity or 2700 L of milk. Cheapest car on the market would cost 4.5 years of household income.

How do you think numbers evolved by 2026 (autocracy vs democracy) ?

Electricity: 37,500 vs 144,000

Milk: 5000 vs 14500

Car : 2.2 yrs vs 0.4 yrs

Note that the nominal per capita GDP between the two countries in 2026 is only about $1500. In 1980, the autocracy had a higher nominal per capita GDP.

Now, tell me, do you recommend autocracy or democracy?

Matt's avatar

So I sort of agree that the data narrative in why nations fail is pretty weak, but I think talking about the choice of “capitalism” vs “communism” rather than “democracy” vs “dictatorship” is missing the point.

A key question that motivated a lot of the institutional economics developments is why don’t dictators generally adopt strong growth policies (“capitalism” for want of a better word) which would then allow them to extract more value from their citizens. And the answer there seems likely to be that there is strong links in both directions between political systems and economic systems. Acemoglu’s paper on Why not a political Coase theorem? Is very interesting in this regard.

None of this necessarily means you have to accept that because the pro market governments of South East Asia became democratic, they were in some ways more democratic to begin with, but I think it is right to accept that it is very hard to maintain a vibrant free market economy over time without some degree of individual rights.

Spencer's avatar

Re: Central planning: Free-market folks claim it doesn’t work yet the USSR managed to stay afloat for 70+ years and N. Korea is still going. Granted these societies were/are poor but they still produce/d and survive/d. How do we explain this? Does planning work at a minimum level? Well, if you study the history of socialism, you learn that central planning meant dispensing with wages, money, prices, profits, etc. However, “really existing socialism” has never done that. So what these societies are is state capitalism with heavy state intervention. They still had/have money, wages, prices, etc.—all the things that the central planners claimed they could do without. This is what allows/ed them to survive. As Mises claimed, socialism cannot plan without prices—and the Soviets proved him right: they kept the money, wages, prices, etc. GOSPLAN was never more than a rubber stamp organization. Central planning—even poorly done—was always a myth that the West, ironically, swallowed even when they recognized it didn’t “work”. Of course, it seems counterintuitive to call the USSR, et al. state capitalism (fascist would also do) but that is what they were/are. Fascism is a terrible economic system but it does achieve some level of production because it doesn’t actually try to centrally plan.

gordianus's avatar

Meanwhile one of the Soviet Union's greatest self-inflicted disasters, the collectivization famines, happened precisely because of central planning: the Communist Party, & especially Stalin, were certain that socialism required collective agriculture with the state administering the farms & extracting all the surplus, & they imposed that model even as its disastrous immediate consequences became clear. Likewise for "war communism".

Spencer's avatar

That’s correct but the USSR never abolished wages, money, prices, etc., which averted total disaster; in other words, they never attempted central planning as conceived by socialists.

gordianus's avatar

Oil wealth also provides some negative examples: Equatorial Guinea &(since Maduro) Venezuela have lots of oil but don't spend it on popular welfare.

Aditya Chandrasekhar's avatar

You seem to assume increased demand from AI trillionaires would result in more human jobs. While this is true if there are some jobs AI cannot automate, if AI can automate all jobs it is not true because then capital is a perfect substitute for labor.

Larry Stevens's avatar

AI is going to kill ~all existing jobs. The survivors will be those whose primary value is human contact. There may be an explosion in such jobs as the others fade away.

China above all has shown that democracy is a non-issue for growth. They even replaced the western VC model with local governments, whom they force to compete with each other without limits. (China has ~140 EV makers, all supported by local gvt).

As we're now seeing in Europe and the US, democracy has the defects elucidated by the ancients. It allows majorities to tyrannize minorities. Democratic socialism abides no limits to how much it is willing to take from makers to give to takers, who vastly outnumber the former. (Remember, half of us are below average). It will take time for this generation to learn these lessons. Oh well.

Spencer's avatar

RH, in your estimation, what % of EHC are Hananian as expressed in this essay?

Ed Powell's avatar

Individual economic freedom plus high average IQ. That's all it takes.

Will I Am's avatar

Good points, but I'm still a cheerleader for democracy because it allows for course corrections that authoritarian regimes have a harder time making. Sure you can have an authoritarian leader who just happens to be a really wise and decent guy, but you can also have Kim Il Sung. The lack of a choice is the issue here. The people end up "waiting on a good king" as in anicent/medieval times.

I think for those countries where democracy hobbles the market system by enshrining popular anti-market policies, perhaps these countries transitioned to democracy too quickly? Or perhaps some nations (similar to most individual humans) are simply doomed to be something in between mediocre and complete failures. Not every nation can be the United States or Singapore, just like not every person can be a doctor, movie star, or a biotech CEO.

My thoughts are that if AI doesn't kill us all and indeed becomes the next big thing for humanity, leading us to a semi-post scarcity future, then having an inefficent "socialist" welfare system won't be that much of a hinderance. If your nation's GDP per capita is the equivalent of today's $1 million dollars post-AI, you can afford nearly unlimited welfare. All of the economic failures of the world will be made successes by AI - if it works as promised.

Seattle Ecomodernist Society's avatar

‘ Human labor keeps being necessary because human needs, wants, and desires are unlimited. ‘ such a basic truth that so many disagree with. Is there any exception to the principle that all contemporary liberal economists are oddly unconvincing?

Worley's avatar

As others have noted, China should be mentioned as an example of Hanania's thesis. One might add that in Britain in 1800 -- well after the Industrial Revolution was rolling -- only about 15% of adult men could vote. (I'm guessing that the adult women had about the same economic interests as adult men and their exclusion didn't change policy much.) But it's clear that the "citizens" involved in the revolution were still quite elite.

> > their citizens overthrew the elites who controlled power and created a society [...] where the great mass of people could take advantage of economic opportunities.

This assertion gets even more interesting within Heath's framework (https://josephheath.substack.com/p/reproducing-civilization) that both institutionalized representative democracy and markets are imposed by elites on the masses because both are incompatible with people's default moral instincts. (Which leads to the interesting question of how the elites maintain the support of the mass voters for a system those voters are going to feel is seriously defective.)