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Brandon Hendrickson's avatar

I'm continually surprised to discover how wide the gap in experience is between us WEIRDOs and folk who are more anthropologically "normies". Have you read happened to read Daniel Everett's "Don't Sleep, There Are Snakes"? The whole book is worthwhile for a bunch of reasons, but he opens with the most relevant part for this conversation. While living with the Pirahas, a tribe in the Amazon, he and his daughter are called to the river, where many of the other villagers are pointing to a "god" who is standing on the other side. He writes:

"Even I could tell that there was nothing on that white, sandy beach no more than one hundred yards away. And yet as certain as I was about this, the Pirahas were equally certain that there was something there. Maybe there had been something there that I missed seeing, but they insisted that what they were seeing, Xigagai, was still there."

His young daughter came out to have a look, and like her father, saw nothing. Everett continues:

What had I just witnessed? Over the more than two decades since that summer morning, I have tried to come to grips with the significance of how two cultures, my European-based culture and the Pirahas culture, could see reality so differently. I could never have proved to the Pirahas that the beach was empty. Nor could they have convinced me that there was anything, much less a spirit, on it.As a scientist, objectivity is one of my most deeply held values. If we could just try harder, I once thought, surely we could each see the world as others see it and learn to respect one another’s views more readily. But as I learned from the Pirahas, our expectations, our culture, and our experiences can render even perceptions of the environment nearly incommensurable cross-culturally."

(Note: I'm quoting some of the interim text from Rod Dreher, who blogged about this, but it is a faithful quote from the book as I remember it, though I've misplaced my copy at the moment.)

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Scott Alexander's avatar

I think this proves too much.

Suppose fifty eyewitnesses say they saw you stab a man in broad daylight. I might conclude: "If there were only one eyewitness, we wouldn't really be sure if he were lying or not. But caring about it being fifty rather than one is the sample size compensation fallacy. So there's no strong reason to believe you stabbed the man."

I think the answer here is - if it were only one eyewitness, we might dismiss him as unusual in some way - a liar, or someone with an axe to grind against you, or feeble-minded and easily manipulated.

Once we have fifty, we know those things are probably not true. So we can't explain this away by appealing to unusual characteristics of the eyewitness. We need to accept that an average ordinary person, in the same situation, would also say he saw you stab the man.

This is a weaker statement than "you definitely stabbed the man". It could be that your identical twin stabbed the man. Increasing the sample size from 50 -> 50,000 doesn't do much to rule this out. (I do think it maybe does a little to rule it out, because you might expect that in a crowd of 50,000, at least one person is some kind of freakish super-recognizer skilled at telling twins apart, and that person might speak up - but I'm not really attached to this).

So I think there are two steps:

- Going from 1 -> 50 is genuinely useful in eliminating negative outliers and getting you to average

- Going from 50 -> 50,000 has limited use beyond that, as you describe

I disagree with the rest of the post on a more factual level.

First, as we discussed, many of the witnesses were not peasants. We don't have enough negative witnesses to really calculate with good sample size whether peasants were more likely to see the event than others, but the very small n we have says not really. One of the advantages of large sample sizes is that you do get the occasional journalist or science professor, and these people seem to have seen the same as everyone else. If you want to say nobody in Portugal was trustworthy by aspect of Portuguese culture, there were some foreigners too.

Second, although we can't 100% rule out strong selection pressure to find positive witnesses and silence negative ones, the evidence we have seems to push against it. The Diocesan inquiry specifically asked negative witnesses to come forward. There was another inquiry that specifically looked for educated professionals to make sure they saw the same thing as everyone else. John Haffert writes that of his ~200 interviews, 198 were positive and 2 were negative. I brought up the anti-clerical climate of the time to argue that if there had been negative witnesses, many of them would have had incentives to come forward, and many newspapers would have had incentives to publish them.

I think the most likely conclusion is that 90%+ of the people at Fatima, including the well-educated people and the foreigners, saw the effect. I think given the large sample size of the crowd, we can conclude that for any given random person, had they been at Fatima, there's a 90%+ chance they would have seen the effect.

I agree with you that this cannot help us conclude between "there was a real miracle" and "there is some very strong illusion that causes lots of people to see a spinning sun under the right circumstances", and that adding more people (100,000! 1,000,000!) would not further change the balance between these two effects. I thought of my post as an attempt to investigate the claim that there's a strong illusion which would cause 90%+ of people to see a spinning sun under the right circumstances, which is a priori pretty strange (most sungazers don't see it, and if you try to look at the sun you'll notice it's not spinning or changing color), but does have some weak evidence in support (the occasional sungazer who does see it, fire kasina, etc).

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