One possibility is that elites are more activist than the public. They station troops in county X in order to give the public a stake in country X. The troops are a "tripwire," for example. If some of our soldiers are killed, the public will want to retaliate, and that gives elites leeway to be activist.
Under this hypothesis, it does not bother the elites that the troops fail to enhance our influence with country X. The actual goal is to influence American domestic opinion. If the public believes that X is our friend (they host our troops, don't they?), then this gives elites more leeway to engage in activist policy--make deals with X, give aid to X, etc.
That's the story of the initial American defeat in the Phillipines: the generals knew that a successful defense of Japan was not possible and they could not get the political support that they needed to build up a sufficient garrison. The soldiers there were doomed, but their defeat served a political purpose. "Tripwire" is usually how it is euphemized, as you said.
It's also reasonably well understood as it relates to Asia that any war in the region would require significant, WWII scale manpower from some combination of the US and allies. The current force levels are there to have a presence, for training, and to serve as tripwires. Raising the manpower that'd be needed for military effectiveness is not possible without a modern equivalent of a Bataan Death March or Pearl Harbor.
There are also theories of 'differentiated credibility' that I would have enjoyed seen directly addressed in this article, since some of the points made about specific countries could have been more effective if they had been directed towards it. This book articulates at least one DoD strategist's thinking on the topic - https://www.amazon.com/Strategy-Denial-American-Defense-Conflict/dp/0300256434
Having worked for the U.S. Military overseas my observation from ground level is that the public has a love/hate attitude towards them being there. Small businesses and landlords love the money GIs spend in the local economy. The U.S. also spends a lot of money to rent the bases and mitigate the effects of our presence. There is also a SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement] that stipulates, among other things, how many locals are employed at the base and in what capacity. This varies from base to base. Some of the locals like us but most don't. They see GIs as rude, invaders, and as the WWII British used to comment "Over paid, over sexed, and over here". GIs are almost never held to local account for any laws they break other than traffic, an never go to jail for more than overnight because the Military Police come and get them and they are often hustled back to the States quickly. Also, the Americans tend to be insular, mostly hanging out with eachother.
The US has dominance over the world’s seas. Commerce can flow freely due to this. We’ve had 30+ years of prosperity and low inflation- unprecedented in human history. A strong argument can be made that military and especially naval dominance is largely responsible for this.
One possibility is that elites are more activist than the public. They station troops in county X in order to give the public a stake in country X. The troops are a "tripwire," for example. If some of our soldiers are killed, the public will want to retaliate, and that gives elites leeway to be activist.
Under this hypothesis, it does not bother the elites that the troops fail to enhance our influence with country X. The actual goal is to influence American domestic opinion. If the public believes that X is our friend (they host our troops, don't they?), then this gives elites more leeway to engage in activist policy--make deals with X, give aid to X, etc.
Maybe this is too cynical.
That's the story of the initial American defeat in the Phillipines: the generals knew that a successful defense of Japan was not possible and they could not get the political support that they needed to build up a sufficient garrison. The soldiers there were doomed, but their defeat served a political purpose. "Tripwire" is usually how it is euphemized, as you said.
It's also reasonably well understood as it relates to Asia that any war in the region would require significant, WWII scale manpower from some combination of the US and allies. The current force levels are there to have a presence, for training, and to serve as tripwires. Raising the manpower that'd be needed for military effectiveness is not possible without a modern equivalent of a Bataan Death March or Pearl Harbor.
There are also theories of 'differentiated credibility' that I would have enjoyed seen directly addressed in this article, since some of the points made about specific countries could have been more effective if they had been directed towards it. This book articulates at least one DoD strategist's thinking on the topic - https://www.amazon.com/Strategy-Denial-American-Defense-Conflict/dp/0300256434
Having worked for the U.S. Military overseas my observation from ground level is that the public has a love/hate attitude towards them being there. Small businesses and landlords love the money GIs spend in the local economy. The U.S. also spends a lot of money to rent the bases and mitigate the effects of our presence. There is also a SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement] that stipulates, among other things, how many locals are employed at the base and in what capacity. This varies from base to base. Some of the locals like us but most don't. They see GIs as rude, invaders, and as the WWII British used to comment "Over paid, over sexed, and over here". GIs are almost never held to local account for any laws they break other than traffic, an never go to jail for more than overnight because the Military Police come and get them and they are often hustled back to the States quickly. Also, the Americans tend to be insular, mostly hanging out with eachother.
The US has dominance over the world’s seas. Commerce can flow freely due to this. We’ve had 30+ years of prosperity and low inflation- unprecedented in human history. A strong argument can be made that military and especially naval dominance is largely responsible for this.